

2019 Advanced Officer Training Plan

- Active Shooter Scenario Training (8 HOURS)
 - o Course outline
- De-Escalation Techniques (1.5 HOURS)
 - o Course outline & PowerPoint presentation
- Crisis Negotiations Team Basics (1 HOUR)
 - Course outline & PowerPoint presentation
- Preliminary Investigations (1 HOUR)
 - Course outline & PowerPoint presentation
- K9 Interactions (1.5 HOURS)
 - o PowerPoint presentation
- Quality Customer Service (1 HOUR)
 - PowerPoint presentation
- Vehicle Dynamics & Accident Avoidance (3 HOURS)
 - o PowerPoint presentation
- Pursuit Policy Review & Update (1 HOUR)
 - o PowerPoint presentation
- Blood Borne Pathogens Refresher/Naloxone/First Responder Awareness (2 HOURS)
 - Course outline & PowerPoint presentation
- PSP Firearms (4 HOURS)
 - Course outline & PowerPoint presentation
- PSP Arrest & Control (4 HOURS)
 - o Course outline

- PSP Driving (4 HOURS)
 - o Course outline
- PSP Tactical Communication (2 HOURS)
 - o Completed online through the POST Leaning Portal at https://lp.post.ca.gov/
- TASER Re-Certification (1.5 HOURS)
 - o Annual Conducted Electrical Weapon (CEW) User Update Version 20.2

Active Shooter for First Responders

I. Introduction

- a. Student registration
- b. Instructor introduction
 - i. Explain expectations
 - 1. Treat scenarios as real and take appropriate action
 - Use tactics and movement taught previously during active shooter training
- c. Course Goal Improve immediate reaction to threats in an active shooter environment using one, two and three man movement
- d. Course objectives
 - i. Definition of an Active Shooter Incident
 - An ongoing event where an individual or individuals have suddenly begun acts of extreme violence against innocent civilians
 - ii. Identify the two primary goals during an Active Shooter Incident (Rapid Deployment)
 - 1. Intervene with deadly force
 - 2. Rescue as many victims as possible
 - iii. Identify the Prioritization of Human Life
 - 1. Hostages/Civilians
 - 2. Law Enforcement
 - 3. Suspects
 - iv. Improve tactics during extremely violent confrontations under stress (Stress Inoculation)
- e. During the classroom portion there will be three instructors per fifteen students
- f. During the practical application there will be two instructors per five students

II. Agency Policy and Procedure

- a. OPD P&P 501.01
 - i. It is general policy of the Department that police officers and others acting under the authority of the Department and authorized to use that force which is reasonable to accomplish a legitimate and legal purpose. The use of any force is governed by the Department's policy and procedure as it relates to a specific force option. The use of deadly force is authorized only when exercised is accordance with the provisions of the Department Firearms and Shooting Policy. The use of the police baton is authorized only when exercised in accordance with the provisions of the Department Baton Policy

III. Practical Application Scenarios

- a. Safety brief
 - i. Guns are always loaded
 - ii. Never allow muzzle to cover anything that you are not willing to destroy
 - iii. Keep finger off the trigger until you are ready to shoot
 - iv. Be sure of your target and background
 - v. Use only 50-60% force against role players
 - vi. No shooting when muzzle of the weapon is within 3' from role player
 - vii. Cease Fire and Stop
- b. Weapons familiarization specific to the use of simunitions
- c. Use of simunition safety equipment. All student will be provided with full face protection as well as all role players. Instructors monitoring will be required to wear eye protection at a minimum

Active Shooter for First Responders

- d. Prior to beginning the scenario portion of the class all students and instructors will be checked by the safety officer. Additionally, the safety officer will recheck the students prior to the start of each individual scenario
 - The safety officer will ensure no real firearms, ammo, tasers, batons, ASP's, knives or any other real weapons are available to the students or instructors
- e. Scenarios
 - i. One instructor per 3 students
 - ii. Two safety officers per scenario
 - iii. One to three students per scenario
 - iv. Minimum of two (2) scenarios for each student
 - 1. The two scenarios will be a two officer response and a single officer response
 - 2. If time allows, students will be given an additional scenario (three officer response)
 - v. Debrief each scenario as it is completed
 - 1. Instructor question options
 - a. What did you see?
 - b. What did you do?
 - c. Why did you do it?
 - d. What could you have done better
 - 2. Entire class (students present) identifies
 - a. Things done well
 - b. Things that could have been done better
 - c. Lessons learned
- IV. Course Evaluation and Final Review

2019 BLOCK TRAINING HOURLY DISTRIBUTION ACTIVE SHOOTER

0830-0900 Greet and Safety Inspection

-Use of Force Policy review

0900-0930 Basic Active Shooter

-What to expect, radio communications, equipment

0930-1200 Active Shooter Movement

- -1 person entries, 2 person entries, 3 person entries
- -Actions/Movement upon suspect and victims

1200-1300 Lunch

1300-1730 Force on Force Active Shooter

- -Reality based scenario training for Active Shooter
- -1, 2 and 3 person entries

1730-1800 Class Debrief

- 1. 2017 / 2018 in review introduction:
 - a. Police-public contacts in 2018:
 - 2018 OPD logged 103883 calls for service.
 - 1. Includes both dispatched and self-initiated activity.
 - 2. These are the situations in which police-public contact was possible.
 - 3. These were the situations in which the use of some type of force—reportable or not—was possible.
 - b. Reportable use-of-force incidents by the numbers 2017-2018.
 - 1. Documented (Department-reportable) use of force incidents:
 - 2017 116.
 - 2018 153 (24% increase).
 - 2. Most frequently used force options:
 - Physical force all types (1).
 - WRAP (2).
 - 3. Suspects injured during use of force incidents:
 - 2017 52%.
 - 2018 54% (+2%).
 - 4. Officers injured during use of force incidents:
 - 2017 25%.
 - 2018 20% (-5%).
 - 5. Frequency use of force incidents per calls for service (2018):
 - 2018 Reportable force occurred approximately once in every 679 police-public encounters (1:679).
 - This equates to .1% of all police-public encounters in 2018.
- II. De-escalation defined:
 - a. **SPO#1**: Provided with a presentation on de-escalation combining lecture, guided discussion, and group exercises, the student will be able to define de-escalation with a minimum performance level of 100%.
 - b. **Definition**: De-escalation comprises the tactics and techniques applied during an adversarial crisis to enhance officer safety, reduce the need to use high

levels of force, and enhance the likelihood of achieving voluntary compliance from the suspect.

- Adversarial crises critical incidents involving a human opponent
 (i.e., the suspect) who is engaged in activity (criminal or non-criminal)
 that places others and/or themselves at some risk of harm.
 - Involve two competing interests -the officer and the suspect.
 - Often the most difficult to manage because of their unpredictable nature.
- 2. **Officer safety** the risk-mitigating actions and practices officers take to enhance their safety in the field.
- Compliance a positive situational outcome in which the suspect's behavior is influenced so that the will to resist is overcome.
 Compliance can be achieved by:
 - Psychological influence.
 - The application of force.

4. Benefits of de-escalation:

- Enhanced officer safety.
- Increased public safety.
- Reduction of violent interactions between the police and the public.
- Improved community police relationship.

5. Three critical de-escalation dynamics:

- Physical dynamic what is the suspect doing (who is at risk)?
 What environmental factors are influencing risk?
- Psychological dynamic is the suspect able and willing to cognitively interact with the first responder?
- Temporal dynamic do the unfolding circumstances provide the officer with discretionary decision-making time?

III. De-escalation applied to specific adversarial crisis types:

a. **SPO #2**: Provided with a presentation on de-escalation combining lecture, guided discussion, and group exercises, the student will be able to describe

the characteristics of criminal and non-criminal adversarial crises and the deescalation strategies used to resolve them with a minimum performance level of 100%.

b. Categorizing adversarial crises:

- Criminal activity: The suspect is engaged in criminal activity that
 places others at risk (ex. hostage situation or barricaded crime
 suspect) the goal is to prevent harm to innocents and safely take the
 suspect into custody.
 - Risk assessment –Who is at risk / causing risk (priority of life)?
 - Does the situation provide discretionary time (pace)?
 - De-escalation efforts should be focused on overcoming the suspect's ability to actively resist and inflict harm on officers / others.
 - The desired end-state is a safe a detention or arrest.
 - De-escalation is integrated into a coordinated tactical response.
- 2. **Non-criminal activity**: The suspect is involved in high-risk non-criminal activity (ex. suicidal ideations).
 - Risk assessment Who is at risk / causing risk (priority of life)?
 - Does the situation provide discretionary time (pace)?
 - Assess what, if any, assistance LE can safely provide.
 - LE may not always be able to help the subject may be unwilling to accept help, even if offered.
 - o The suspect may be unable / unwilling to communicate.
 - If you establish a special relationship, honor it avoid making unrealistic promises.
 - De-escalation efforts are directed stabilizing the situation and influencing positive behavior change.
 - o Influencing the suspect's behavior may not be possible.
 - Stabilizing the situation sometimes means LE disengages (tactically repositioning)

- 3. Combined criminal and non-criminal activity: a suspect may be engaged in high-risk criminal activity while also exhibiting non-criminal at-risk behavior.
 - Risk assessment Who is at risk / causing risk (priority of life)?
 - Does the situation provide discretionary time (pace)?
 - Often the most complex and time consuming situations to which LE responds.
 - The de-escalation tactics for resolving these types of incidents will need to involve a combination of strategies.

IV. Priority of life & risk assessment:

- a. **SPO #3**: Provided with a presentation on de-escalation combining lecture, guided discussion, and group exercises, the student will be able to explain priority of life and how it assessing risk during a response to a crisis situation with a minimum performance level of 100%.
- b. **Definition**: Priority of life is a tactical concept which rank orders the situational value of the lives of the participants in an adversarial crisis.
 - 1. Innocent bystanders and those identified as victims.
 - Law enforcement personnel (and other first responders). The nature of the LE role always carries some degree of inescapable risk in adversarial crises.
 - 3. Suspects the party(s) creating the risk to others through their criminal and/or non-criminal conduct.
- c. Risk and the first responder: Adversarial crises potentially expose everyone involved (victims. Officer, and suspects) to some degree of risk. There are situations in which the importance of an innocent victim's life regardless of risk status—could become secondary to the importance of the life of the first responder.
 - 1. These situations involve circumstances in which any life-saving action the first responder attempts will almost certainly fail and could (in the extreme) result in the loss of the first responder's life.

- 2. Taking a calculated risk to perform one's duty when there is a realistic chance of achieving a successful outcome is not the same as surrendering one's life in a no-win situation.
- d. **Risk assessment**: When applying the priority of life concept to tactical decision-making it is important to move beyond just thinking about POL as a *value of life* scale and view it from the perspective of risk:
 - 1. Risk influences both the response strategy and discretionary time.
 - When deciding on how to respond, the tactics and strategies should not unnecessarily enhance the dangerousness of the unfolding crisis.
 - De-escalation of any adversarial crisis requires time. Some high-risk events can evolve so rapidly that intervention with force becomes necessary because de-escalation cannot be safely or effectively employed.
 - 2. First, identify who is at risk:
 - The suspect.
 - Innocents / victims.
 - The involved officer(s).
 - 3. Second, identify who is causing the risk.
 - 4. Third, having assessed who is at risk and who is causing the risk formulate a course of action:
 - Example no one is at risk or causing risk, de-escalation is an appropriate first response.
 - Example the suspect and no one else is both at risk and the cause of that risk, de-escalation tactics are an appropriate first response.
 - Example the suspect is at risk and causing risk to others, intervention to stop the suspect from causing risk to others is an appropriate first response.

e. Risk analysis is continuous:

- The suspect's dangerousness may change as the incident progresses
 this changes the degree of risk faced by others.
- Always be prepared to adapt the response tactics to the current level of risk.

V. Assessing the situation:

a. SPO#4: Provided with an instructional presentation on de-escalation combining lecture, guided discussion, and group exercises, the student will be able to describe key de-escalation concerns with a minimum performance level of 100%.

b. Key de-escalation concerns:

- 1. Is the situation a crisis or a problem?
 - A crisis situation can evolve rapidly. This limits discretionary time and reduces the effectiveness of any potential deescalation efforts. If the officer or others are exposed to an imminent risk of harm, attempts at de-escalation may even enhance the risk to the involved officers or others.
 - Problem situations evolves much more slowly than crises.
 Problems almost always provide officers with a greater degree of discretionary time. Problem situations are not characterized by the presence of imminent risk of harm to anyone.

2. Is there a duty to act?

- No affirmative duty to act in all situations regardless of circumstances.
- Your duty is to the public at large not to any one individual.
- Deshaney v. Winnebago County no general duty under Federal civil rights law to protect individuals from private violence.

 Castle Rock v. Gonzales – no procedural due process violation when a police department did not actively enforce a restraining order.

3. Special relationships:

- Created when the officer makes a promise or implies an individual level of care.
- If not provided exposes the recipient to a significant risk of harm.

4. State-created danger:

- Occurs when the actions of LE aggravate or unnecessarily escalate the dangerousness of the situation
- See Glenn v. Washington County.

V. Effective verbal communication:

- a. SPO #4: Provided with an instructional presentation on de-escalation combining lecture, guided discussion, and group exercises, the student will state and explain how the language and commands law enforcement officers' use for control can positively or negatively influence situational outcomes in high-risk response situations with a minimum performance level of 100%.
- b. **The goal compliance**: Police officers use language to communicate intent, provide direction, and elicit information.
 - Stress hormonally induced (SNS) stress influences (usually in a negative way) how the officer and the suspect communicate with one another.
 - Sympathetic Nervous System (SNS) stress can negatively how the officer communicates.
 - The suspect's ability to communicate can also be adversely influenced by SNS stress.
 - 2. How officers communicate directly influences the suspect's understanding or lack of understanding of intent and desired end-state.
 - 3. Officers are expected to maintain an outwardly professional demeanor even in high-stress encounters.

- This requires a high-degree of emotional control by the involved officer.
- This is especially challenging when engaging with a suspect who is emotionally out of control or violent.
- When the officer loses the ability to effectively communicate in these situations, the ability to influence the suspect in a positive way is significantly degraded or even lost.
- c. **Verbal command categories**: The way we communicate with an adversary can be categorized as being either *Alpha* or *Beta* in terms of how we express commands when interacting with the suspect:
- e. Command categories verbal commands can described as being either an *Alpha* or *Beta*, depending on the explicitness or vagueness of the officer's word choice and phrasing:
 - Alpha commands: Alpha commands are clear and easy to understand. The language used leaves little doubt as to their meaning and the intent.
 - Beta commands: Beta commands are difficult to understand, vague or incomplete. The intent of the officer's words can be difficult, if not impossible, for the suspect to interpret. Repeating the same command multiple times in quick succession is an example of the Beta command type.
 - The use of Beta commands during an adversarial encounter do not by themselves guarantee the interaction will devolve into violence.
 - In incidents that escalated to violence, officers used Beta commands at a much greater frequency than alpha commands.
 - Officers who perceive they have situational control are more likely to use Alpha commands.
 - As the perception of situational control diminishes, the use of Beta commands begin to occur at a higher frequency. This is likely due to the officer experiencing the effects of SNS stress.

- 3. Behavioral change stairway:
 - Empathy: Understanding the suspect's point of view through active listening.
 - Rapport: An active exchange of information and open conversation between the officer and the suspect.
 - Influence: Affecting a positive change in the suspect's behavior so that a positive change occurs and compliance is achieved.
- b. **Goal setting**: Goal setting is a method of mental preparation for highrisk events that can help to mitigate the effects of SNS stress.

1. How it works:

- Keeps the pre-frontal cortex engaged during high-stress events.
- Mitigates the debilitating effects of SNS activation.
- Goal setting is something you do before the high-risk encounter occurs – it is mental rehearsal for what you will do and what you anticipate encountering during high-risk events.
- Draws on your existing training and experience.

2. Goal-setting process:

- Identify the high-risk event to which you might have to respond.
- Identify the potential threat cues and other hazards.
- Mentally formulate a primary response (plan-A).
- Mentally formulate an alternate response in the event plan-A does not work (plan-B).

VI. Student learning activities:

a. SPO #5: Provided with an instructional presentation on de-escalation combining lecture and guided discussion, the students will participate in a series of classroom exercises and case study debriefs in which they will identify appropriate de-escalation tactics and strategies to solve the given scenarios.

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
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
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
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
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
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




































































GOAL SETTING: • Helps keep the pre-frontal cortex (thinking part of the brain) engaged during high-stress events. • Mitigates the effects of SNS stress by keeping emotions in check.














OCEANSIDE POLICE DEPARTMENT

CRISIS NEGOTIATIONS CNT BLOCK TRAINING

Expanded Course Outline

A. WEL	COME	&	INTRO	DUC	TION
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3 Min

- 1. Greet students
- 2. Present instructional goal (Power Point)
 - a. Advise will consist of CNT BASICS

B. CNT MISSION

1. Key Topics

5 Min

- a. Negotiation Priorities
- b. CNT Objectives
- c. CNT Considerations

C. CNT ROLES AND STRUCTURE

1. Key Topics

12 Min

- a. Use of CNT
- b. Crisis Response Structure
- c. Limitations
- d. CNT Personnel
- e. Video
- f. First Responder Priorities
- g. Seven Deadly Sins
- h. Negotiable items
- j. Things to Consider

Expanded Course Outline


D. SOCIAL MEDIA	
1. Key Topics	10 Min
a. Video	
b. Positive Aspects of Social Media	
c. Negative Aspects of Social Media	
d. Traditional Media	
e. Methods of Communication	
E. THIRD PARTY INTERMEDIARIES (TPI)	
1. Key Topics	10 Min
a. TPI's	
b. Types of TPI's	
F. BEHAVIORAL CHANGE STAIRWAY MODEL (BCSM)	
1. Key Topics	10 Min
a. Purpose of BCSM	
b. Active Listening Skills	
c. Empathy	
d. Rapport	
e. Influence	
G. SUICIDE	
1. Key Topics	10 Min
a. Video	
b. Types of Suicidal Subjects	
c. Suicide Communications	
d. OPD Suicide Stats 2018	
e. Negotiator Introduction	



TED TALKS • HTTPS://WWW.YOUTUBE.COM/WATCH?V=4CNRMHLEJMK • UNDERSTANDING • TIMING- WHEN TO DELIVER MESSAGE • DELIVERY- HOW TO DELIVER THE MESSAGE • RESPECT- GOLDEN RULE

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

- CNT MISSION
- FUNDAMENTALS OF CRISIS NEGOTIATIONS
- CNT ROLES AND STRUCTURE
- THE TACTICAL ROLE OF THE NEGOTIATOR
- SOCIAL MEDIA
- THIRD PARTY INTERMEDIARIES
- BCSM
- SUICIDE




MISSION

- BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION THROUGH PERSUASION
- MINIMIZE THE NEED FOR A TACTICAL INTERVENTION
- DIFFUSE CRITICAL INCIDENTS INVOLVING SUSPECTS WHO ARE:
 - SUICIDAL
 - BARRICADED
 - HOSTAGE-TAKING
 - **ENGAGED IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES**

NEGOTIATIONS PRIORITIES

- PRESERVATION OF LIFE
 - LE PERSONNEL
 - *HOSTAGE/VICTIM
 - SUSPECT
- *APPREHENSION OF SUSPECT
- RECOVERY AND PROTECTION OF LIFE





PATROL PRIORITIES

- CONTAIN
- ISOLATE
- ESTABLISH CONTACT (SUSPECT, WITNESS, VICTIMS, FAMILY MEMBERS)
- GATHER INTEL (SOCIAL MEDIA, PHONE NUMBER, HOBBIES)
- CONSIDER TACTICAL OPTION

CONTAINMENT

ONCE A SUSPECT IS CONTAINED, CNT'S OBJECTIVES ARE:

- INITIATE COMMUNICATION WITH SUSPECT(S) AND DEVELOP RAPPORT
- **BUY TIME**
- DIFFUSE INTENSE EMOTIONS
- GATHER INTEL TO ASCERTAIN THE OPTIMAL NEGOTIATION INTERVENTION STRATEGIES AND TACTICS
- PERSUADE SUSPECT(S) TO RELEASE HOSTAGE(S) / RELINQUISH WEAPONS
- PERSUADE SUSPECTS TO SURRENDER

CNT CONSIDERATIONS

WHEN A CNT INTERVENTION BECOMES NECESSARY:

- WEAR DOWN THE SUSPECT(S) TO A DEGREE WHICH
 WOULD LESSON THE AMOUNT OF RESISTANCE OFFERED
 TO THE TACTICAL INTERVENTION
- MANIPULATE THE SUSPECT(S) MOVEMENTS TO OFFER THE SAFEST POSSIBLE CONDITIONS FOR A TACTICAL INTERVENTION



OPD CNT

- CNT IS USED ROUTINELY DURING SEARCH WARRANTS AND CRISIS CALL OUTS.
- THERE ARE 10 NEGOTIATORS, 2 SGT.'S, 1 LT.
- THE 10 NEGOTIATORS ARE BROKEN INTO 2 TEAMS, EACH HEADED BY A SGT
- ON CALL 24/7 AND WILL RESPOND AS NEEDED FOR A PREDETERMINED MISSION/CRISIS CALL OUT

CRISIS RESPONSE STRUCTURE

- INCIDENT COMMANDER (CMDR) LT OR HIGHER
- SWAT CMDR LT OR SGT IN ABSENCE
- CNT CMDR LT OR SGT IN ABSENCE
- SWAT TEAM LEADERS SGT OR SR SWAT OFR
- CNT TEAM LEADERS SGT OR SR CNT OFR
- CNT PRIMARY NEGOTIATOR CNT OFR
- CNT SECONDARY NEGOATIATOR (SPANISH) CNT OFR (BILINGUAL)
- CNT INTEL. CNT OFR
- CNT COMM./ RUNNER /CNT VAN CNT OFR
- CNT/SWAT LIASON SWAT OFR
- MENTAL HEALTH PRO. PERT OFR /NOTE: DOES NOT NEGOTIATE! ADVISORY ONLY!

CNT ROLES

CNT TEAM LEADER (SGT)

- A SENIOR OFFICER OR SGT. WHO ORGANIZES THE CRISIS RESPONSE TEAM, SELECTS ITS MEMBERS, PLANS AND OVERSEES TRAINING, AND MAKES DEPLOYMENT DECISIONS IN EMERGENCIES. HIS OR HER ROLE MAY OVERLAP WITH THAT OF THE ON-SCENE INCIDENT COMMANDER, WHO IS THE PERSON IN CHARGE OF THE ACTUAL HOSTAGE CRISIS.

CNT ROLES

CNT PRIMARY NEGOTIATOR

- THIS OFFICER WILL ESTABLISH COMMUNICATION WITH THE HOSTAGE TAKER/SUBJECT, AND NEGOTIATE A SUCCESSFUL AND PEACEFUL RESOLUTION TO THE CRISIS.

CNT ROLES

CNT SECONDARY NEGOTIATOR/COACH.

- THIS OFFICER IS BACKUP OR TAKES OVER IF THE PRIMARY NEGOTIATOR IS UNABLE TO ESTABLISH SUFFICIENT COMMUNICATION WITH THE HOSTAGE TAKER, OR IF THERE ARE LANGUAGE OR CULTURAL BARRIERS INVOLVED, OR IF THE PRIMARY NEGOTIATOR NEEDS A BREAK AFTER MANY HOURS OF TALKING.

CNT ROLES

CNT INTEL. OFFICER.

- THIS OFFICER WILL GATHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE HOSTAGE-TAKER AND HOSTAGES — INCLUDING FAMILY MEMBERS, PAST CRIMINAL AND/OR MENTAL HEATH TREATMENT HISTORY, DEMOGRAPHICS, IDENTITY OF THE HOSTAGES AND THEIR RELATION TO THE HT, AND ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE THAT WILL BE USEFUL IN PLANNING AND CARRYING OUT THE NEGOTIATION.

CNT ROLES

CNT COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER.

- THIS OFFICER WILL KEEP IN CONTACT WITH ALL OF THE INDIVIDUALS AND AGENCIES WHO ARE IMPORTANT IN MANAGING THE CRISIS, SUCH AS CMD POST PERSONNEL AND RELAY INFORMATION BETWEEN THE TWO.

CNT ROLES


CNT/SWAT LIAISON OFFICER


- THIS OFFICER WILL ACT AS A CONDUIT BETWEEN CNT & SWAT, LISTENING IN ON THE NEGOTIATION TO SHARE REAL TIME INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WITH SWAT OPERATORS ON PERIMETER POSITIONS.

LIMITATIONS

WHAT CNT DOESN'T DO:

- ROLL OUT TO EVERY 11-45
- CNT DOES NOT ALWAYS RELIEVE 1ST RESPONDERS
- NEGOTIATORS ARE NOT DEPLOYED INDIVIDUALLY (TEAM CONCEPT). DO NOT START WITH ONLY ONE NEGOTIATOR ON SCENE.





FIRST RESPONDERS

WHEN FIRST RESPONDERS BECOME INVOLVED IN A NEGOTIATION IN WHICH CNT MAY BE CALLED OUT:

- AVOID MAKING ANY HARD / COMPLEX COMMITMENTS
- DON'T MAKE PROMISES
- AVOID USING PERSONAL CELL PHONE
- AVOID THE SEVEN DEADLY SINS

SEVEN DEADLY SINS

DURING AN ACTIVE NEGOTIATION CNT DOES NOT PROMISE / OFFER THE SUSPECT(S) - (AKA SEVEN DEADLY SINS):

- GETAWAY CAR
- RANSOM MONEY
- ALCOHOL/DRUGS
- WEAPONS
- EXCHANGE OF HOSTAGES
- RELEASE PERSON FROM CUSTODY
- EXEMPT ANYONE FROM PROSECUTION

GENERALLY NEGOTIABLE

- ACCESS TO MEDIA
- CONTACT WITH FAMILY/ FRIENDS (TPI)- BE CAUTIOUS
- FOOD/ DRINK
- PRESCRIPTION MEDICATION
- SPECIFIC MEDICAL ATTENTION
- *EITHER CAN BE USED AS A REWARD OR SURRENDER

THINGS TO REMEMBER

- MINIMIZE DISTRACTIONS AND NOISE WHEN COMMUNICATING WITH SUBJECT
- ALWAYS RECORD
- DISCUSS ARREST PLAN WITH CNT TEAM PRIOR TO DISUSSING IT WITH SUBJECT
- YOU MAY BE REQUIRED TO TALK THE SUBJECT OUT STEP BY STEP
- STRIVE FOR HONESTY TO ENSURE CREDIBILITY
- MINIMIZE MULTIPLE OFFICERS CONTACTING SUSPECT -TRANSFIDORS



CRISIS NEGOTIATOR

- A FORCE MULTIPLIER FOR SWAT
- THEY HELP ENHANCE THE ASSAULT PLAN AND ITS EXECUTION
- THEY HELP PLAN FOR THE SURRENDER, DELIVERY, AND RELEASE OF HOSTAGES AND SUSPECT.

INTELLIGENCE GATHERING

- NEGOTIATORS ESTABLISH DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH THE SUBJECT
- GATHER INFORMATION ON THE STRUCTURE LAY OUT
- GATHER INFORMATION ON NUMBER OF SUBJECTS INSIDE
- ESTABLISH LOCATION OF SUBJECTS, HOSTAGES, AND WEAPONS

SUMMARY

NEGOTIATORS AND TACTICAL TEAM SHOULD WORK TOGETHER FROM START TO FINISH.

- FOR THE TACTICAL TEAM, NEGOTIATORS:
 - BUY TIME FOR TACTICAL/FORCED ENTRY
 - POSITION SUBJECTS IN DESIRED LOCATION
 - ADVANTAGE MAKERS
 - INTEL GATHERS



POSITIVE ASPECTS OF SOCIAL MEDIA

- AS AN OPEN SOURCE FORM OF COMMUNICATING, SOCIAL MEDIA APPLICATIONS CAN BE A SIMPLE AVENUE TO TALK TO STRANGERS, ACQUAINTANCES, SUSPECTS ETC.
- THERE ARE MANY TYPES OF RESOURCES TO COMMUNICATE NEEDS/OR DESIRES.
- IN TODAY'S WORLD, COMMUNICATION TAKES MANY FORMS AND IS THE NORM FOR PEOPLE TO NOT USE THEIR ACTUAL VOICE AND MAKE A PHONE CALL.
- SO, THE REALITY IS, THOSE SUSPECTS/SUBJECTS ARE GROWING UP WITH SOCIAL MEDIA AND PREFER TO COMMUNICATE IN OTHER NON-TRADITIONAL WAYS.

NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF SOCIAL MEDIA

- SOME SITES, SUCH AS INSTAGRAM, FACEBOOK REQUIRE KNOWING THE USERNAME.
- SO, WITHOUT KNOWING USERNAME, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO LOCATE THE TARGET PERSON ON THAT SITE.
- WITHOUT ACTUALLY HEARING A SUSPECTS VOICE, WE CANNOT UNDERSTAND OR SENSE THEIR EMOTION(S) OR ANXIETY.

TRADITIONAL MEDIA

LIVE TELEVISION REPORTING

POTENTIAL ISSUES: PROXIMITY TO THE LOCATION, CNT VAN, ETC.

LIVE TV HELICOPTER FOOTAGE

POTENTIAL ISSUES: SUSPECT WATCHING THE NEWSCAST AND LEARNING OF UNIFORMED PERSONNEL POSITIONS AND AMOUNT OF OFFICERS, ETC.

PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER TO DEVELOP RELATIONSHIP WITH REPORTERS TO GIVE DIRECTION AND RELEVANT INFORMATION AND STATUS OF SITUATION.

METHODS OF COMMUNICATION

- PHONE
- TEXT
- EMAIL
- MEDIA
- SOCIAL MEDIA- INSTAGRAM, SNAPCHAT, TWITTER, FACEBOOK
- WHAT'S UP
- FACE-TO FACE
- BULL HORN/PA

IN CONCLUSION

- WITH THE USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA SITES TO CONTACT A SUBJECT, WE MAY BE ABLE TO ESTABLISH A RAPPORT AND FORM A RELATIONSHIP.
- OUR GOAL IS TO ULTIMATELY COMMUNICATE WITH OUR SUBJECT AND KEEP THEM ENGAGED, AND IF VIA FACEBOOK, TWITTER ETC, IS THEIR CHOSEN CHOICE OF COMMUNICATION THEN WE WILL HAVE TO ADAPT TO THAT SITUATION.
- IF USED SUCCESSFULLY, A SOCIAL MEDIA EXCHANGE WITH OUR SUBJECT MAY CHANGE HIS/HER BEHAVIOR AND HELP US GAIN COMPLIANCE.




THIRD-PARTY INTERMEDIARIES

- IT IS A WAY TO CHANGE THE FLOW OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, FOR INSTANCE, THE TPI WHEN USED CORRECTLY CAN DIFFUSE A TENSE SITUATION IN AN INDIRECT, FACE SAVING MANNER.
- A PERSON WHO POTENTIALLY HAS INFLUENCE OVER A SUBJECT IN HOSTAGE/ BARRICADED SITUATION
- FACTORS TO CONSIDER WHEN DECIDING TO USE A TPI- CAUTION & CONTROL

MONTANA STANDOFF






MONTANA FREEMEN

- 81 DAY STAND OFF WITH FBI
- THE INCIDENT ALLOWED FBI TO IMPLEMENT THE USE OF TPI'S, THE POLICY'S AND PROCEDURES THAT CAME FROM THAT INCIDENT ARE STILL TAUGHT TODAY.
- THE USE OF TPI'S PROVE EFFECTIVE WHEN EMPLOYED PRUDENTLY AND WITHIN AN APPROPRIATELY CONTROLLED ATMOSPHERE.

WHO CAN BE A TPI?

THE TWO TYPES OF TPI'S:

- FAMILY/ASSOCIATE: CAN APPEAL TO SUBJECTS' EMOTIONAL NEEDS, FURTHERING A "DIVIDE AND CONQUER" STRATEGY AND UNDERMINING THE UNITY INHERENT AMONG SUBJECTS IN A SIEGE SITUATION.
- FORMAL/OFFICIAL INTERMEDIARIES: CAN INFLUENCE SUBJECTS' VIEWPOINTS AND BROKER SOLUTIONS MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE GROUP.



BCSM

BCSM CONSISTS OF FIVE STAGES:

- **ACTIVE LISTENING**
- EMPATHY
- RAPPORT
- INFLUENCE
- BEHAVIORAL CHANGE

BEHAVIORAL CHANGE STAIRWAY PURPOSE: TO LOWER EMOTIONS & RETURN SUBJECT TO "NORMAL" ESTABLISH RAPPORT AND INFLUENCE GATHER INFORMATION ENCOURAGE BEHAVIORAL CHANGE

ACTIVE LISTENING

"TO ACTIVELY PROVIDE FEEDBACK TO DEMONSTRATE UNDERSTANDING"

ACTIVE LISTENING SKILLS

- EMOTION LABELING
- PARAPHRASING
- MIRRORING/REFLECTING
- SUMMARY
- OPEN ENDED QUESTIONS

- MINIMAL ENCOURAGERS
- EFFECTIVE PAUSES
- EFFECTIVE PAUSES
- "I" MESSAGES
- **EMPATHY VS SYMPATHY**

ACTIVE LISTENINING SKILLS

EMOTIONAL LABELING

- STATING YOUR OBSERVATION OF THE EMOTION HEARD...
 - "YOU SOUND..."
 - "YOU SEEM...."
- EXCELLENT WAY TO BEGIN, AND EFFECTIVE THROUGHOUT'
- EASY TO BACK OFF FROM... "I DIDN'T SAY YOU WERE ANGRY, I SAID YOU SOUND ANGRY..."

ACTIVE LISTENING SKILLS

PARAPHRASING

PUT IT IN YOUR OWN WORDS; RESTATING THE SUBJECTS COMMENT

- USED FOR BRIEF CONFIRMATION AND TO DISPLAY ATTENTIVENESS
 - SUBJECT: "SHE DOESN'T PAY ATTENTION TO WHAT I SAY AND IT MAKES ME ANGRY...."
 - NEGOTIATOR: "SHE DOESN'T LISTEN TO YOU...."

OCEANSIDE POLICE DEPARTMENT

General Investigations Best Practices

Expanded Course Outline

A. Welcome & Introduction

3 Min

19 Min

- 1. Greet students
- 2. Present instructional goal (Power Point)
 - a. Advise will consist of Best Practices for FPU/PCU/COV

B. Family Protection Unit (FPU)

- 1. Key Topics
 - a. Child Molestation
 - b. Child Abuse
 - c. Rape
 - d. Domestic Violence
 - e. Elder Abuse
 - f. Restraining Order Violations

C. Property Crimes Unit (PCU)

- 1. Key Topics
 - a. Investigation/reporting
 - b. Video Evidence
 - c. Common crimes
 - d. Follow-up investigation
 - e. Blue Sheets

Expanded Course Outline

D. Crimes of Violence

- 1. Key Topics
 - a. Robbery
 - b. Assault with a deadly weapon
 - c. Kidnapping
 - d. Attempted murder
 - e. Murder

19 Min

INVESTIGATION BEST PRACTICES

Property Crime Unit Family Protection Unit Crimes of Violence Unit

FAMILY PROTECTION UNIT (FPU)

- ► Child Abuse (physical, sexual, neglect)
- ▶ Child pornography/exploitation
- ▶ Sexual Assault
- ▶ Domestic Violence
- ► Elder Abuse
- ► Restraining Order Violations
- ▶ 290's
- ► Stalking, 653m, revenge porn, etc.

CHILD ABUSE

- Get basic statement (corpus) from the reporting party.
 - Most of the time the incident has not just occurred.
- ▶ Do not interview the child if the child is 13 years old or younger.
 - A Forensic Interview will be conducted by the Detective assigned.
- ▶ If 14 years old or over, get basic statement on what occurred.
 - · Obtain statement in a private interview
 - Obtain PC 293(a)-Victim privacy form if they desire (sex crimes)
 - The Detective assigned will conduct a complete video/audio interview
- ▶ Get as much victim/suspect/reporting party information as possible.
 - · Ensure the victim is not in danger of continuing to interact with the suspect.
- Contact and report incident to Child Protective Services.
 - · Mandated regardless of how long ago the incident occurred

FORENSIC INTERVIEW

(VICTIMS 13YO AND YOUNGER)

- ▶ Can be done for child molest, child abuse, or witness to a crime
- A forensic interview is conducted by a trained and certified Licensed Care Social Worker
 - Interviews are done in a controlled environment and the interview is audio and video recorded.
- ▶ The interview has to be scheduled by the Detective
 - · Can take up to a couple of weeks to get an appointment
 - · Interviews are done at Palomar Pomerado Health Center in Escondido
- ▶ Forensic interviews can be done on older victims with mental capacity of child under 14 years old

RAPE / SEXUAL ASSAULT

- Obtain basic statement to determine elements of a crime UNLESS the crime just occurred and a suspect is in custody
 - · Obtain statement in a private interview
 - Obtain PC 293(a)-Victim privacy form if they desire
 - · Detective assigned will conduct complete interview
- ▶ If the crime occurred within 72 hours, coordinate the SART Examination
 - CAP exam for victims 13 and under. (Ages 0-11 require parental consent)
- ▶ Collect as much evidence from the crime scene that is pertinent to the case
 - · Clothing, bedding, or something that would contain DNA evidence
- Do not promise victims any outcome of the case, or when a Detective will be contacting them
- ▶ Provide victim with sexual assault pamphlet and a case number

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

- Obtain statements as detailed as possible to determine dominant aggressor
 - Complete DV supplemental for ALL DV cases and attach to case
 - · Check physical or visible injuries and document them
- If strangulation was mentioned in your investigation, complete the countywide strangulation supplemental
 - Request a Field Evidence Technician and photo injuries / or lack of injuries and collect other relevant evidence
- ▶ DAFE (Domestic Assault Forensic Exam) is available for serious cases.
 - Coordinate through Palomar Health (same number as SART)
 - · Also available for serious elder abuse cases
- Provide DV pamphlet with a case number
- ▶ Explain the restraining order / emergency protective order

FPU CLOSING POINTS

- When in doubt, contact your Supervisor, or the FPU Supervisor.
 - · Detectives are also available to assist when needed
- Get complete and accurate contact/identification information for all parties involved in your case
- Complete ALL required documents as it pertains to your particular case (CPS & APS notifications)
- ► TRO's Ensure good service
 - If no follow up is needed, the victim desires prosecution and the elements are met, submit a warrant affidavit with your crime report to send to the DA's office.
- ➤ Child Custody www.visitation.sdcda.org
- ▶ Any successful investigation begins with the initial responding Officers

PROPERTY CRIMES UNIT (PCU)

- ▶ Common crimes
- ▶ Investigation/reporting
- ▶ Video/Photo Evidence
- ► Follow-up investigation
- ▶ Blue Sheets

COMMON CRIMES

- ▶ PC 484g Fraudulent use of an Access Card
- ▶ PC 488, PC 459.5 or PC 459
- ▶ PC 530.5(a). Identity Theft
- ▶ PC 476 Forgery; fictitious or altered bill, notes or checks.
- ▶ PC 648 Making, issuing or circulating unauthorized money.

INVESTIGATION/REPORTING

- ► Conduct an Investigation, do not just take a report.
- ► Ask questions.
- ▶ Leads and Suspect Information equals follow-up investigation.
- ▶ Correct demographics
- ▶ List all persons mentioned in report in RMS
- ► Add yourself to the witness list.
- ▶ All officers added to witness list.

VIDEO/PHOTO EVIDENCE

- ► Consider reviewing the video footage
- Consider returning to the business the following day or two and see if the video is available.
- ▶ Book original CD's and thumb drives uploaded into QueTel
- verify video uploaded properly
- picking up video for a case previously reported case.
 - ▶ 1. Upload and Book
 - **2.153**
- ▶ The DA's Office has access to the QueTel but not RMS.
- ▶ Download all digital evidence into the QueTel.
- ► Body Worn Camera (BWC)

FOLLOW-UP INVESTIGATION

- Consider expanding your investigation and tackle the leads while they are fresh and include your follow-up actions in your report.
- ► Consider draffing and issuing a "Be on the Lookout" (BOL) flyer.
- ► Consider writing an Arrest Warrant Declaration (AWD)

BLUE SHEETS

Partner with a Detective and take on an occasional follow-up investigation where you did not take the original crime report commonly called a "Blue Sheet." You can speak with Sgt McKean or any Property Crimes Detective for assignment of a case.

CRIMES OF VIOLENCE (COV)

- ▶ Robbery
- ► Assault with a deadly weapon
- ▶ Kidnapping
- ► Attempted murder
- ▶ Murder

CRIME SCENES

- ▶ Do not enter crimes scenes. If you feel you need to remove evidence, collect evidence or search homicide victims, Do Not Do It.
- Do not introduce items into a crime scene, ie placing targs over bodies.
- ► Secure the scene, tape off the scene and share observations with responding FET.
- If you do alter the scene, make sure you share with your supervisor and detectives and articulate in your report your actions.
- ► Consider Trace Evidence when at a scene/For example, when the crime has been established and crime scene is secure do not disturb areas that could have human hair or DNA left behind, ie. Do not walk through a room continuously if not needed.

DOCUMENTATION

- ▶ Be specific when documenting/writing your 11-10 when the step is outside.
- ► For example, if the Victim/suspect fought in the parking for of an address, please articulate if they were 50' directly in front of the entrance door, 25' south of the planter box at the exit, the 6th parking stall south of the ¼ corner of a building etc.
- ► This will help when attempting to locate vide surveillance, and/or follow-up with witness canvass.


FOLLOW UP


- Please get an email address for victims as some victims change phone numbers/addresses.
- ▶ Be diligent when retrieving video surveillance, follow-up with fictim business the day after your response or still on your work week, or take a few more minutes and attempt to download potrage yourself if employees on scene do not have the skills to download.
- ▶ In rare circumstances, use BWC to record the video surveillance, but please review and see if it's helpful, but always get a disc or thumb drive of the video.

11-44 SCENES

- ▶ When responding to an apparent 11-44 scene, please be diligent when calling the Medical Examiner's office.
- If they do not want to respond and give a waiver #, please be supposed possible evidence has been considered, a thorough witness captures has been done.
- ▶ If you are not sure, please share your observations with a supervisor and discuss possibilities/circumstances.
- If an overdose of suspected heroin or fentanyl, a detective will probably not respond, so please collect victim cell phone and sociment drugs and paraphernalia with photos.
- ► Ask ME to collect the drugs on suspected fentanyl OD cases per the DA's fentanyl taskforce agreement. Collect the drugs yourself if they refuse.

QUESTIONS ?





This Presentation

- Review of P&P
- Capabilities of each OPD K9 Team
- K9 Functions
 - Building/Area Searches
 - Tracking/Trailing
 - Pursuits/Hot Stops
 - Deterrents/Direct Apprehensions/Officer Protection
 - Article/Narcotics Searches



K9 Policy & Procedure

- Mutual Aid (P&P 901.06)
- Apprehension Guidelines (P&P 901.07)
- Deployment Considerations (P&P 901.08)
- Warnings (P&P 901.09)



K9 TEAMS & CAPABILITIES

- Patrol = Searches/tracks for suspects, apprehension, deterrent
- Narcotics Searches = Heroin, Cocaine, Methamphetamine (includes Ecstasy)
- Article/Evidence Searches = discarded weapons, contraband, items
- SWAT



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


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
P&P Review: Considerations for deployment of K9

- Nature and seriousness of crime
- Whether violence or weapons were used or are anticipated
- The degree of or threat of resistance
- Perceived age of suspect
- Potential of injury to officers or the public if the K9 is not used.
- Potential danger to the public or officers at the scene if the K9 is released.
- Potential for escape if K9 not used
- Evaluate the scene for hazards— CONTINUED

P&P 901.08


Deterrents


- · Gain compliance/De-escalation




Apprehensions

- Don't run in front of K9
- Avoid unnecessary verbal commands. Leave commands to handler.
- Avoid going hands on until handler obtains control of K9
 - Generally handler will direct you to go hands on.
- Be mindful of unnecessary commentary








P&P Review: Apprehension guidelines


- Can be used if the handler believes that the suspect has committed, is committing or threatening to commit any serious condition and the following apply:
- The suspect poses an imminent threat of violence or serious harm
- The suspect is physically resisting or threatening to resist arrest and the use of the K9 appears to be necessary to overcome the resistance.
- The suspect is believed to be concealed in an area where entry by the K9 poses less risk to the officers or public.
- OBJECTIVE REASONABLENESS- mere flight will not serve as justification for K9


P&P 901.07

Building Searches

- Forced Entry
- Burglaries
- Barricaded suspects
- When K9 team is utilized for a search, they will assume control of the search.
- Cover officer will watch their area of responsibility and be alert for safety issues.







1



P&P Review: Warnings


- On forced entry 11-72s and suspected burglaries of buildings, K9s may be considered for use off or on leash
- On non forced entry incidents, the K9 may still be deployed on a six foot or longer leash
- On either case, warnings should be given and the suspect shall be given an opportunity to call out and surrender.
- If warnings heard on the perimeter, this should be relayed via dispatch.


P&P 901.09

Area/Field Searches

- MAINTAIN PERIMETER POSITION
- Determine suspect's last known location
- If the K9 is utilized, the K9 handler will assume control of the search
- K9 will use a cover team to assist with search
- Cover team will cover K9 handler
- Do not watch dog








P&P Review: Additional Apprehension Guidelines

- ONLY The WC may approve using a K9 to locate and apprehend a suspect wanted for lesser criminal offense.
- Absent any immediate threat to officers or others, this approved use should be conducted on leash.
- If, in any circumstance, the suspect no longer presents a threat, (surrenders) handler must secure the k9 as soon as practical.
- If a suspect is controlled after a K9 apprehension, the K9 must be removed from the bite as soon as practical.

P&P 901.07

Tracking/Trailing

- Establish perimeter as quickly as possible.
- Maintain perimeter position, while search is conducted.
- Determine last know location, suspect description, and direction of travel.
- DO NOT contaminate the scene by walking in the area where the suspect was last seen or fled.
- DO NOT pick up or move any items discarded by suspect (clothing, hat, shoes...).








P&P Review: Considerations continued

- Whenever possible, handler should try to communicate and coordinate with members involved to minimize potential injury.
- Handler is responsible to gather all facts and determine if use is reasonable and appropriate.
- Handler shall have the authority to decline using the K9 when he deems the use is unsuitable. (doesn't meet criteria, too dangerous for others in area, or K9 may be unable to accomplish the desired task due to ability)
- A Supervisor apprised of the situation may direct that the K9 NOT BE DEPLOYED
- Unless otherwise directed, officers should take direction from the handler.

P&P 901.08


Pursuits

- Initiating Officer shall advise reason for pursuit, and any further information regarding the crime or suspect involved.
- K9 vehicle will take #1 position in pursuit if possible.
- K9 handler will attempt to advise when the dog will be deployed from the vehicle.
- Stay inside your patrol vehicle until the K9 is deployed if the K9 is going to be utilized.



Hot Stops

- Request K9 assistance before initiating traffic stop or hot stop if possible.
- K9 Handlers will make admonishments reference the deployment of the dog.
- K9 handler will determine if the dog will be deployed to search the vehicle.
- Attempt to determine from suspects in custody if there are: other occupants, animals, kids, food, etc...
- Depending on crime, dog may not be deployed into vehicle.





Nose Work/Scent Discrimination


- Narcotics/Human Odor Paired with command
- Strength of Odor (Emotional Scent, Time, Individual)



Narcotic "Sniffs"


- Vehicles, Buildings & Parcels
- Cocaine, Heroin & Methamphetamine (includes ecstasy)
- Avoid extensive search of vehicle prior to K9 Sniff
- Environmental hazards = may not deploy K9
- K9 should be deployed within 15 minutes of initiating stop (Case Law)





Article Searches

- Some K9's can be utilized to search for evidence or contraband discarded by suspects
- Do not contaminate the area where the article might be located



Injured Handler

- If a handler is unable to get his dog off the suspect or back in his car due to injury:
- If available, a k9 officer should respond.
- Each k9 vehicle has training gear (sleeve.)
- Drive the k9 vehicle near to the location of the k9 and open the back door. BACK AWAY. Lure the k9 to car, and close door



Questions?	